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Britain . . . are already organizing definite corps of health visitors, mostly voluntary workers, who act as the eyes and ears of the medical officer of health, and regularly visit in a helpful way the families committed to their charge. Similarly, with the new duties connected with medical inspection and treatment, the Local Education Authorities are organizing, under one name or another, their own volunteer Children's Care Committees, the members of which are individually charged to keep in friendly touch with all the families in which there are ailing or necessitous children of school age. . . . It is indeed already plain that each of the several preventive authorities, dealing with the several sections of the population, needs for the effective discharge of its duties, not only its own salaried staff, but also an extensive fringe of volunteer workers, specialized to its particular service and gradually acquiring a certain training in its work, with which to maintain the necessary touch and personal contact with all the families of the city. . . . We look, therefore, for a great expansion in the sphere of personal benevolence and voluntary service; not by way of irresponsible alternative to the action of the public authority, but by way of supplementing and informing this, and supplying the 'human element' (*Ibid*, pp. 40, 41).

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GODWIN AND POLITICAL JUSTICE.

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THE name of William Godwin is one which, I am afraid, arouses but little enthusiasm in the breast of the modern student of literature or politics. Even before his death he had for the most part lost his vogue, and he has never had the fortune to be rehabilitated in any large degree, although he possesses claims that are at least respectable in two widely separated fields; his novels can still be read with a tolerably lively interest. But his reputation as a man unequal to the rank he had temporarily usurped has followed him, and rather unfairly handicapped his just claims.

An estimate of Godwin's philosophy cannot be altogether separated from his personal characteristics, to which a few words are due. The most obvious thing about him, which stands out on the least acquaintance, is that in him the intellectual qualities were developed

GODWIN AND POLITICAL JUSTICE

at the expense of the emotional. Through life he was governed by a rational deliberateness which has its laudable side, but which must frequently have been to the less perfect mortals who surrounded him distinctly aggravating. He had a rooted distrust, both theoretical and practical, of anything like impulsiveness, of giving himself over to the current of spontaneous instincts however generous and human. On the whole, one can hardly avoid the judgment that he was a good deal of a prig. He has the prig's formal perfection of good habits, his unshaken confidence in the superiority of his own motives, his insatiable desire to live on a pinnacle, to serve as guide, philosopher, and friend to his associates, to be forever instructive and condescending. "I am in every respect," he says of himself, "so far as I am able to follow the dictates of my own mind, personally indifferent to all personal gratifications. I know of nothing worth the living for but usefulness and service to my fellow-creatures. The only object I pursue is to increase so far as lies in my power the quantity of their knowledge and goodness and happiness." "For years," he writes again, "I scarcely did anything at home or abroad without the inquiry being uppermost in my mind whether I could be better employed for the general benefit." There is something to be admired in this no doubt, but there is also visible more than a touch of the prig. No one can test continually the details of living by a self-conscious philanthropic standard without tending to become abnormal, and developing an undue sense of the importance of philanthropy and his own philanthropic self. In Godwin there is continually cropping out the defects of his virtue. "You may grieve me, but you cannot inspire me with anger," he writes to a youth with whom he had quarreled; and we can detect in his words the assumption of conscious virtue and reasonableness condescending to weakness, which is of all things most maddening to the ordinary sinner.

As Godwin's philosophy is relatively unfamiliar, it

will be necessary to start with a sketch of its main features, before I can turn to the points to which I wish chiefly to call attention. Men come into the world without any distinctive character, but with the potency of an unlimited development. This development is the outcome of certain simple laws. External impressions are made upon us; these are found to be connected with various pleasures and pains; and this system of interconnections, or associations, determines the complex of our characters and our lives. All our conduct is determined in the end, therefore, by ideas which have got associated with pleasurable or painful feelings, and which consequently lead to efforts to obtain the one and avoid the other; our acts are due, that is, to *opinions*, or reason, since reason is nothing more than a utilitarian recognition or calculation of consequences. It follows that human happiness or misery will depend very largely upon what it is that gives rise to these opinions. Now a vast number of them, and these the most highly important, are not formed through direct and first-hand experience, but are the indirect product of our social surroundings, of the institutions under which we are brought up. The first business therefore of the philosopher who desires the good of mankind, is to determine what is, and what is not, the desirable form for government, or social organization, to take. Or, since every one admits in some sense that government should be just, what is the nature of justice?

Godwin's answer is, that justice is that principle of conduct which in every act keeps clearly in view the best possible interest of the whole. That we should be no respecters of persons, that in every judgment we should put ourselves in the place of the perfectly impartial spectator,—such expressions represent the essential quality of justice. If, for example, it is a question which of two men I am to prefer when there is a benefit I cannot render to both, then I should ask myself without prejudice in whose hands it will accrue to the largest advantage to

the race. This will exclude all preference based on inherited prejudice, prescription, the accidents of circumstance or birth. It excludes, too, the principle of self-seeking. Reason recognizes that I am but one unit among many, with no superior claims except as I happen to be a person of superior virtue; and therefore I shall give not the slightest preference to myself simply because I happen to be myself. In like manner it has no place for private gratitude; and the same thing is true of those other more permanent ties, of country or of family, which are commonly held to occasion a superior force of obligation.

Since now man in his true nature is a creature of reason, it can be set down that the best form of government is that which most completely recognizes his claims as an autonomous being, governing his own life voluntarily by conscious rational principles. That a monarchy or an aristocracy has on the whole no tendency to produce such a character, but rather places a premium upon mental insincerity and inertia, and a fawning and servile spirit, Godwin attempts at some length to show. Of all existing forms, democracy is indisputably the best. But even democracy is not ideally perfect, for to the searching eye of philosophy there remains a flaw in the very notion of government itself, which therefore any conceivable form of government must share.

The defect is this, that government at its best makes use of coercion, and coercion is always an evil, alike because it rests upon an infliction of pain, and because, more fatal still, it takes the place of the one right motive for action,—rational understanding and choice. No man is moral who does not freely will benevolence for its own sake. Government may be a necessary evil for a long time to come, but still it is an evil. Godwin's own ideal is that of a loose confederation of small parishes, each managing its own affairs, and sending when necessary delegates to an Amphyctionic Council with an advisory power simply. Internal disputes are to come before a

jury which decides each case as equity demands,—for there will be no legal codes,—and which, too, can gradually shed its coercive power as men grow in reason, until in the end we may look to see it give place altogether to a voluntary submission to the judgment of him whose greater wisdom the sense of the community recognizes.

About this doctrine of philosophical anarchy center the most characteristic articles of Godwin's creed. Obviously, for one thing, it does away with punishment. But there are other forms of slavery in society beside that of penal law. The boy, for example, is also a human and rational being, and must be freed from the tyranny of the school and schoolmaster. Promises and contracts furnish another and more subtle way in which liberty can be restricted. We are not to be handicapped by our own past desires and opinions, and so a promise is immoral. This is one of Godwin's chief indictments against the institution of marriage. It may be added that marriage is a monopoly, which is always odious; and as an attachment to an individual without reference to merit, it is plainly unjust.

While Godwin, accordingly, upholds the principle of democracy on its negative side, as a denial of all monopoly and privilege, he is equally keen to remove any suspicion that he is giving countenance to a communistic restriction of individual initiative. Indeed he is for going to the other extreme, and getting rid not only of compulsion, but of voluntary coöperation even, as interfering with the sufficiency of the rational self. The peculiarity of his attitude, in its opposition to the existing ideal of monopolistic society and to communism alike, comes out most sharply in his doctrine of property. From the principle of justice it is no far cry to his conclusion that property belongs where it is most needed, as a promoter of individual and social good. I have thus no rights to a thing which is not demanded by my real needs. To withhold the superfluous loaf of bread from my starving neighbor marks me plainly as unjust; to

give it is no act of voluntary and praiseworthy charity, but only what the law of justice itself requires. But now this does not lead, with Godwin, quite to the issue which it might seem to imply. On the surface it would appear to take away all philosophic ground from the institution of private property. But before we fall back on a communism of goods, we have to consider how this could at present be brought about and maintained. And clearly it would require some measure of coercive regulation. Differences in accumulated property are bound to be the outcome of differences of circumstance, ability, and application, unless they are restrained by positive law. And so in distribution for use. I have for whatever reason in my possession some article which my neighbor could also apply to his needs; what shall decide between us when we both claim it? Godwin's answer is, that the principle of justice makes it binding on me to give up to him the article if on impartial survey he seems to me to need it more than I, but that it does *not* give *him* a right to take it by force when I fail to allow voluntarily his claim. Justice in property is a moral principle, and not a social regulation, a duty rather than a right. Rights, in Godwin's philosophy, are never fundamental; they are grounded indirectly on this præëminent fact of the moral obligation of each individual to meet the demands of justice. Politics, that is, is a mere phase of individual ethics. The consequence is, that for practical purposes, until it comes about that we are all perfectly wise and perfectly generous,—when no disputes will arise,—the present institution of private possession is justified on the ground of expediency. The real basis of private property is, accordingly, the right of private judgment, which will not allow any one to force a man to share with others that which he wishes not to share. If everyone were to enforce what he considered his own right, it would not only violate the claims of reason as the sole adjuster, but it would bring about a state of anarchy fatal to human happiness.

It would have been very easy, were one maliciously inclined, to have touched up the sketch of Godwin's opinions in a way to make them appear even absurdly futile. As it is, I should not be greatly surprised if the impression given was that of a mere doctrinaire and visionary, busied with Utopian schemes quite removed from actual human facts and motives. But the better acquainted one becomes with Godwin and his writings, the less plausible does this judgment seem. As a matter of fact, he is on the whole a very shrewd, careful, and sometimes subtle reasoner, extraordinarily painstaking in following out the ramifications of his argument, and fertile in anticipating objections, with a keen eye for sophisms, and possessing, within rather well-defined limits, a wide and not unpenetrating acquaintance with the workings of human nature. It is true that Godwin knows men rather externally and mechanically. His novels are remarkable examples of what may be done in the way of such an elaborative deduction of character, without much help from a sense of the more intimate and non-rational springs of conduct. Below a certain level he is indeed quite at a loss. This is commonly the case, for instance, when he touches upon the facts of the religious life, as distinguished from religious creeds and history. Thus Paul's cry, "I am chief of sinners," is to Godwin as a genuine expression of experience a blank impossibility; and he proceeds to render it intelligible by suggesting that it is a profession Paul conceived himself in duty bound to make, as a doctrinal consequence from Jesus's commendation of lowliness of spirit among his disciples. We need not be greatly surprised, therefore, to find him incapable of seeing in religion anything but the "nightmare that has pressed down all the exertions of the human mind," and talking with some condescension of Jesus's "extraordinary ignorance of the nature of man." But at least it is to be said for him that, whatever he may miss in the significance of his topic, he always does have some real point to make, some real meaning in his

mind, which one may suspect is not always true of more profound philosophies. And usually, too, the more one considers it, the more there is to say for Godwin even where he departs farthest from the safe and sane. Take his depreciation of gratitude. What Godwin has probably chiefly in mind to speak against is, as we have come to recognize, one of the very great dangers in public life. When personal favors, influence, pull, are made the basis of political action, gratitude does become immoral. So of his strictures on education. Perhaps few persons nowadays are ready to go the length of abolishing systematic education altogether, or to be impressed by the awful tyranny that is involved in any constraint upon the inclinations of the younger generation. But if anything is clear, it is that Godwin's views on education are far and away ahead of his time. Indeed I doubt if there could be found a single English writer prior to the latter half of the century just past, who has so firm a grasp on the principles which are at present leavening educational methods. That even the boy has rights which are infringed when there is forced upon him a mass of facts out of relation to his childish needs and interests; that sympathy with child nature is the soul of education; that study with desire is the only real activity; that the knowledge when and how to ask a question is no contemptible part of learning; that a good share of the boy's really valuable training comes through his sports, when he really thinks instead of laying up materials for thinking, whereas much that goes on in the schools is pure waste and futility; that the aim of education should be to test the individual in a variety of interests in order to discover where his talent lies—this, the modern doctrine of interest, is enforced by Godwin, particularly in some of his later writings, with a really considerable power and insight.

But these after all are details, and they leave the main business untouched. So long as Godwin's fundamental premises,—the omnipotence of reason, and the principle

of universal benevolence,—are set aside as the sentimentalisms of a shallow age, which our own profounder day has exploded, he can have no special claim upon the present. But I am not convinced of the adequacy of this modern disposition to treat men as mere representatives of a bygone period, which our academic formulas have definitively summed up and pigeon-holed. It might be very well could we depend on finding each new age formula fully just to the preceding one; but more commonly, I suspect, it is only the substitution of one shibboleth for another. Godwin thought that the wisdom of all time had been embodied in the doctrine of the association of ideas. We smile at his simplicity, but it does not prevent us from talking as if we ourselves of the century of evolution and physical science had a final formula of our own. It will not be superfluous, then, to ask whether the rational benevolence of the eighteenth century deserves quite the scorn that is now so frequently meted out to it.

Godwin's doctrine that reason is the sole effective engine of reform may be split up into three propositions which sufficiently express its nature. First, men do, with unimportant exceptions, act normally upon opinions, good or bad. In the second place, no permanent betterment of society can take place which is not based upon right opinion, generally diffused throughout the body politic. And, finally, when we trust to reason rather than to secondary motives, we actually do find men recognizing it and responding to it in the long run.

Now putting the gospel of reason in such terms as these, it is not too much to say that it coincides with the point of emphasis in the movements that are taking place in American democracy to-day. One of the obvious signs of the times is the rapidly growing doubt about the efficacy, on the one hand of political organization, and on the other of mere legal enactment. That we are overloaded with legislation, a very large part of which no one thinks seriously of enforcing, has become a common-

place; and at least one main reason for its ineffectiveness is the fact that it is not backed by enlightened public judgment. The time was when Godwin's proposal that legislatures meet only one day in the year may have seemed the height of anarchistic folly; to-day there are, it is safe to say, a great many very respectable members of society who would jump at the suggestion. One large class of the failures which the enemies of democracy are continually bringing up against it, is due to this endeavor to force public opinion rather than enlighten it. Even so apparently extreme a notion as that all legislation be given merely an advisory power, and that we trust to the reasonableness of the public to back it rather than to force, has its counterpart in the rather general modern tendency toward arbitration of a more or less non-compulsory sort. One thing at least is certain, that upon what Godwin calls the power of right reason, the faith that mankind when it really thinks about a thing has a tendency to think right in the end, the whole possibility of democracy rests.

Now, theoretically, Americans always have recognized this; but practically they have placed their main reliance in a very different direction,—upon organization, namely, or party. It is only within the recent past that we have begun to try systematically, and with some distinct consciousness of what we are about, the one remedy that goes logically with the theory of democracy. And publicity, and independent political judgment on the basis of it, are a pretty direct translation of Godwin's political teaching. Godwin does not say that all men are capable at present of acting according to reason and justice. What he does say is this: that until they are so capable, no free institution has a secure foundation, and that the only way to make them open to reason is to give them a fair chance at it. And when they are given the fullest possible basis for judgment, Godwin affirms that they will prove themselves ultimately equal to their obligations. Whether or not this proves to be justified,

we are beginning to suspect, at any rate, that as yet the remedy never has had a fair trial. One of the most significant of modern political movements is the incipient attempt to see what would happen if it were made a fact; and incidentally it is justifying Godwin the philosopher of reason. What *rôle* parties are to play in the politics of the future it is too early to attempt to prophesy. Supposedly they are not likely soon to be discarded. But as between the principles of party allegiance and regularity, and independency, there can be slight doubt to which the future belongs. We have come to see by hard experience that the emphasis on regularity leads straight toward undemocratic institutions; and one main reason is that on which Godwin is constantly insisting,—that it dulls the individual's power of judgment instead of sharpening it, and so delivers him bound into the hands of interested self-seekers. We shall doubtless have new parties in the more or less immediate future, to meet new issues; but it is not in them as parties that our real hope lies, but in a sufficient number of voters who refuse to hand over their opinions in the lump to any organization, but who limit their allegiance to the actual present issue, which they endeavor to decide as sensibly as they may, by the use of their own impartial reason. There is throughout in Godwin a refreshingly clear-headed insight into the romanticism through which officialism and partisan ambition combine to becloud the simple issues of government. The average man seldom stops to consider how large an element of quackery there is in the professional side of the business of running a nation. The habit of throwing about public affairs a veil of solemn and portentous secrecy, and the "trick of a mysterious carriage" in those who deal with them, is largely responsible for the prevalent notion that such matters are too high for ordinary folk. Godwin is probably right in affirming that the professional soldier is greatly overrated, by himself and others, in comparison with the capacity for the business of war of the untrained

mind of good intelligence; and certainly this is true of the esotericism of legislation or diplomacy, which last in particular, in its traditional claims, is rapidly sinking to its proper level as a moderately successful subject for third-rate novels of intrigue. Indeed the claims of the expert, from the field of medical jurisprudence to the tariff, are fast becoming discredited by reason of the wholly false and superstitious basis on which they have been wont to place themselves. Contrast with all such indirections the simple and pregnant words of Godwin: "Truth is the proper element of the human soul, and frankness its becoming habit." This is the real inner spirit of his rationalism, which no philosophy of society can safely outgrow.

It is hardly possible to separate sharply in Godwin between reason and benevolence, because the outcome of reason is with him always disinterestedness, and service to mankind. And in what has just been said there is a reference to the humanitarian side. But now in this special connection there is another reason for a certain discredit into which Godwin's type of social philosophy has fallen at the present time. It is no longer fashionable to talk about the love of man and universal benevolence. We are for being very cool and scientific. We will profess no emotional enthusiasms in our reforming, and will count on none in mankind generally to help us out. Things happen according to law, and particularly according to economic laws, which are for the most part grim and practical affairs, and leave little point to the vaporings of our humanitarian sympathies. Let us get down to bed-rock. Men are creatures engaged in a life and death struggle with the forces of nature, not kindly souls dispensing Christian charities to their neighbors. Recognize this. Recognize that you can move them only by making it worth their while, and to this end study first of all to know what are the laws of the universe on which the satisfaction of their material needs depend.

I should be the last to deny that this modern turn for

realism is on the whole most salutary, or that it hits Godwin in perhaps his weakest point. There is in him a notable lack of sense for the significance of the material basis of life. This shows clearly in his psychology, where the mind is omnipotent, and the body negligible. Thus rather than allow the dependence of ability upon the brain, Godwin would explain the larger size of the wise man's skull, supposing that really it is larger, on the ground that it was stretched by the greater activity of the mental processes in childhood; fainting, to quote another instance, is to be avoided by thinking more clearly rather than by attending to the bodily machine. So in his schemes of reform, he never will see that the laws of the material and economic world may have something to say about the perfectibility of the species; almost the only place where physical law enters at all into his dreams, is in connection with the light-hearted anticipation of a perfection of mechanical invention which shall so harness the forces of nature as to place the most extensive operations in the hands of a single man, and free him from the need of coöperation with his fellows. That Godwin can suppose this, without feeling it incumbent upon him even to put the question whether this complicated machinery is itself to be built and transported also without coöperation, indicates the very casual nature of his glances at the material side of things. And furthermore, Godwin in his zeal for vindicating benevolence as a real principle of human nature, is much too inclined to deprecate any less disinterested motive as a positive moral defect to be ruthlessly excised, until we are left with a world of men each busily looking out for everybody else with no thought of himself, all engaged in taking in one another's washing, but doing it gratis. For all his individualism, Godwin's emphasis is so little on self-development and fullness of personal life, that he even thinks it necessary to justify the claims which a man's private interests have upon himself, on the ground that he is a part of that whole which alone should

occupy our endeavor. It has already appeared that Godwin in his notion that the highest and most indispensable duty of man is to study and promote his neighbor's welfare, has some family resemblance to what the uncharitable might call a busybody. In like vein he argues strongly against any compensation for public officials; it would be too unendurable a thought to the truly good man,—the suspicion that a partially selfish motive might be mixed with his public zeal. And it is very characteristic that when asked how else the citizen who did not happen to possess an independent income is to support himself in office, he replies that he should trust to private benefaction, in other words, find a patron.

But when all is said, there still remains something on Godwin's side. There is no inconsiderable risk attending on the modern preference for social realism and materialism. I will not stop to consider the tendency of science to make of itself a final end, and to think slightly of those further interests to which the practical mind desires to apply its results. Especially in the science of man and man's life, it is not well to become too engrossed in the mere desire to know, too much in the habit of looking on human beings as a subject for brochures and theses. So we see the anthropologist becoming very vexed and voluble when it is proposed to spoil his raw material through attempts to better its conditions. We have the sociologist insisting that he is a scientist and nothing more, and rather pluming himself on making no pretence to an ability to be of the least assistance in solving human problems. Even the professed philanthropist is showing some tendency, not merely to become the investigator, which is altogether to be applauded, but to adopt the mental habits of him who is an investigator before everything else. But these consequences are trifling when compared with others more positive. There is a distinct tendency on the part of this modern protest against sentimentalism and idealism, to transform itself into an apology for things as

they are. Since Malthus was able to allay the uneasiness of the solid men of property in his generation, by assuring them that there was no danger of any such calamity as a general extension of prosperity, since the eternal law of the universe, under the guise of the law of population, is inexorably opposed to benevolence and universal happiness, there has been a constantly recurring disposition to assume that an affinity exists between human misery and economic truth, that to be indifferent therefore to schemes of regeneration is the mark of the real, unimpassioned truth-seeker, while hopefulness and enthusiasm are the mawkish product of a weak hold on realities.

I am not proposing, however, to refute the man who denies the validity of ideals of social improvement, but simply to raise the question whether the fascination of the new scientific grounds for progress has not unwarrantably thrust aside the simpler aspect for which Godwin stands. Godwin's great lack is one of practicable method, and this a thoroughgoing knowledge of the material bases of society alone can supply. But at least the supposition that we are safe in trusting wholly to this trend of natural forces is scarcely to be regarded as well advised. It is no more than the old doctrine of an acquiescence in the ways of Providence, with all the presuppositions removed that give any reasonable ground for imagining that the world is going to pay the least attention to our wishes. If we want anything in this world, we had best make up our minds that it is coming to us only because we want it, and so that back of the possible ways of going to work there must be a sufficient motive power to get the right ways chosen. And we may also as well make up our minds that no motive is going to bring about a regenerated society which is not, whatever else it may be, too, that same motive of a love for the common good, and a disinterested hatred of injustice, to which Godwin gives the name of benevolence. There is no real security for justice in society until, as Godwin puts it, men when "under the influence of generous sentiments

will feel that they are at home." So long as they are seeking every one the main chance, and are incredulous of the possibility of a more generous temper, of a service that looks to no immediate selfish reward, any permanent social good is a contradiction in terms. So long, for example, as a revolt against the methods of organized capital has its backing in the less successful, who would do just the same things themselves if they were only smart enough, it is reasonable to suppose that there will always be a sufficient number of reformers who can be seduced from their allegiance when they become formidable, to keep the magnates from any serious cause for apprehension. If socialism is nothing but a personal desire for better wages and an envy of the rich, there is not the slightest reason to think that it will ever have sufficient solidarity to be formidable to shrewd and resourceful opponents. There is a large element of political wisdom in Godwin's dictum that the end of politics is gradually to wean men from contemplating their own benefit simply in all they do; taken not as a statement of what we can actually expect of men at a given moment, but as something which political institutions ought to have in view as a part of their outcome if they are to show any principle of progress in themselves, this is far truer than the philosophy of the practical politician, who sees in the selfishness of human nature an eternal bar to any idealistic form of social organization, and would therefore reinforce it by fitting institutions deliberately to such lower motives, and declining to take any chances with the others. It may well be that Godwin is inclined to talk too much about benevolence and virtue, to trust too exclusively to preaching, exhortation. Certainly the degree in which he is inclined to divorce benevolence from self-interest is bad tactics. Indeed we are coming gradually to see that only then can we look for the best social results when, instead of the spirit of benevolence, that at best tends to stand out separate from and superior to its task, there is substi-

tuted that fellowship which works for a common end, mine and my neighbor's alike, and which is too much interested in the outcome to consider very particularly whether it is working out of altruism so-called, or just because it finds the work worth while. But unless the reality of a social end and interest be there, and be there as a potent and fundamental source of action, democracy may look to see itself bankrupt in the near future.

If one were to ask for the reasons why Godwin's own treatment in the *Political Justice* fails quite frequently to carry conviction and impressiveness, it might perhaps be found in two considerations. He has, to begin with, rather too easy a sense of the requirements of right reason. These principles of justice seem to him to be,—and in a sense they are,—so very clear and simple, that he can hardly conceive it possible but that, were I to buttonhole my neighbor, and carefully and systematically pour into his ears my argument, he should become a convert. With no adequate conception of the instinctive basis of human nature, Godwin fails to recognize that putting a verbal argument into a man's head is not very effective, unless you can be sure of attaching it to some real and vital impulse; and therefore that all sorts of byways of experience may be required to make of logic a living force. The possibility, for example, that punishment under right conditions may succeed in touching springs of self-revelation and motivation which argument is powerless to reach, is something which in his discussion of penal law lies quite beyond his range of vision. And Godwin fails to appreciate, too, the confusing and disheartening way in which the considerations of naked justice are implicated in the very complex system of relationships under which they have to be applied. Many a man will in the abstract admit that he ought to be ready to do his neighbor good, who is sincerely at a loss to see how this is to be put in practice under actual business conditions. And to reiterate the principles is not to solve his problem. Now Godwin's

answer is this: The principles, you allow, are simple; then reduce the social conditions to a like simplicity, and you will have no trouble. But this is the second and the main reason for Godwin's lack of appeal. For him the relationships of society are merely the sum of uncomplicated relationships between innumerable pairs of individuals. This anarchism,—in the philosophical sense,—is presupposed in nearly every side of his philosophy; and almost invariably it weakens the force of his argument. If his doctrine is translated out of personal into social terms, it gains largely in force.

What I mean may be illustrated again in his conception of reason as the only true motive. I have interpreted this in terms of the value of social publicity, and the development of a social conscience and sense of responsibility. But Godwin does not stop here; thinking as he does of human relationships as first of all personal and particular, it goes to justify to him also his own peculiar belief in his vocation as a missionary. Each man, that is to say, is to make himself personally responsible for all of his acquaintances, help them regulate their conduct by reason, be "the generous censor of his neighbor to tell him in person, and publish to the world, his virtues, his good deeds, his meannesses, and his failures." It is a matter for congratulation that few men have so sensitive a conscience as Godwin's in this direction, or life would scarcely be tolerable. Godwin is temperamentally quite lacking in reticence. He would have everyone "make the world his confessional," "utter nothing that is false, and withhold nothing that is true." Witness his demand that sexual matters, since they are as much facts as anything else, should be as freely talked about in society. But in public dealings the value of publicity stands on a quite different plane, and Godwin loses through failing to distinguish.

Of course, in his own ideal society this distinction rather falls to the ground, through the absence of any save a modicum of public business. But this points to

the final and practically most important query to which Godwin's political theory gives rise. He fails almost entirely, that is, to recognize the problems that grow out of the industrial organization of society. To those who have less faith that life in the modern world can be lived without organized activity, it is becoming the supreme question whether this is to be left to chance, and the shifty grasping of opportunities by clever individuals, or whether society to protect itself is not bound to take some charge of its own interests. But with such a tendency Godwin's anarchism is far less out of sympathy than would appear on the surface. At most it is a question of judgment and not of underlying motive. The laws required for industrial efficiency are laws indeed, but they are of a quite different sort from those of retributive punishment. They seek a positive rather than a negative end; they are not restrictions first of all, but creative of opportunities. The whole intent of such regulations is in reality the same as Godwin's,—to substitute justice for the current ideas of property, legal status, established authority, which are interested in checking the extension of an equality of opportunity to the advantage of those who are already in possession, or who have the peculiar gifts and deficiencies that promise success in a general scramble. Godwin denies the need of organization, and thereby loses his chance to make any contribution to the special problems of the present. He had only to change this intellectual conviction, and by the whole movement of his thought he would have passed from the Anarchist to the Socialist.

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